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Introduction 
 The theoretical perspective that has come to be known as the resource-based view 
of the firm suggests that sustainable competitive advantage often originates inside the 
firm, and that strategy at the firm level is therefore driven by firm-specific resources and 
capabilities. Human resources hold a prominent position in these resource-based theories 
of the firm. To date, however, few empirical studies have assessed the role human 
resources plays in driving firm strategies, largely because large-sample data on firm-level 
human resources are difficult to come by. 
 In this paper, we take advantage of the development of new Census Bureau data 
sets developed out of the Longitudinal Employer-Household Dynamics (LEHD) 
Program1 and the Center of Economic Studies to explore the linkages between firm-level 
human resources and one aspect of firm strategy: diversification. The resource-based 
view of the firm suggests that diversification arises as firms attempt to leverage non-
tradable firm-specific resources, among them human resources. We explore this 
possibility by examining recent diversification activity in the relatively newly deregulated 
American financial services industry to investigate whether characteristics of firms’ 
internal labor markets influence their subsequent diversification activities. 
A Resource-Based View of Diversification 
 What sparks firm diversification, and why do diversified firms exist? Studies of 
diversification have long been a mainstay of economics as well as strategic management 
research (Montgomery, 1994; Ramanujam and Varadarajan, 1989; Hoskisson and Hitt, 
1990). Economic theory generally assumes that firms are organized with a single product 
                                                 
1 The Census Bureau, the National Science Foundation, the Sloan Foundation and the National Institute on 
Aging generously supported the creation of the LEHD data bases as part of a social science database 
infrastructure initiative. 
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focus and face a homogeneous factor market (Scherer, 1980). Based on those 
assumptions, a market power view (Edwards, 1955) of diversification emphasizes the 
benefits a firm may reap at the expense of its competitors and customers.  More skeptical 
views offered by agency theorists emphasize the benefits that diversification offers to 
firm managers themselves, often at the expense of its shareholders (Jensen, 1986; Shleifer 
and Vishny, 1989). 
 The resource-based view of the firm (Barney, 1991; Penrose, 1959; Wernerfelt, 
1984)  suggests a different perspective, emphasizing firm resources and capabilities as 
the principle basis for strategy, including diversification activity. The resource-based 
view begins with the idea that firms are heterogeneous with respect to resources and 
capabilities that are not perfectly mobile across firms (Teece, Pisano and Shuen, 1997; 
Barney, 1991, 1986; Montgomery, 1994; Amit and Shoemaker, 1993; Hoskisson and 
Hitt, 1990; Teece, 1982; Penrose, 1959). Resources are stocks of available factors that are 
owned or controlled by the firm, including physical, intangible, and financial resources 
(Chatterjee & Wernerfelt, 1991). Firm capabilities refer to a firm’s capacity to deploy 
resources, usually in combination, using organizational processes, to affect a desired end 
(Amit et al., 1993). 
 In order for firm-specific resources and capabilities to generate competitive 
advantage, they must be valuable, relatively rare, and relatively inimitable or immobile 
(Barney, 1986; 1991), enabling the firm to earn rents. The effectiveness of firm strategies 
depends on the utilization and exploitation of existing resources (Dierickx & Cool, 1989; 
Wernerfelt, 1984; Teece, 1980; Penrose, 1959).  To the extent that firms have pools of 
underused resources, these create unique, firm-specific opportunities for exploitation 
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(Chandler, 1990; Teece, 1980; Penrose 1959; Mahoney and Pandian, 1992; Montgomery, 
1994). 
 Diversification is one such strategy for exploiting existing firm-specific resources: 
firm diversification can be understood as a process through which managers first identify 
resources that are unique to their firm, and then decide in which markets those resources 
can earn the highest rents (Teece, Pisano, and Shuen 1997). Some firm resources are 
‘indivisible’ (Penrose, 1959) and therefore ‘sticky’ (Teece, Pisano, and Shuen, 1997), 
and, particularly if they are intangible, difficult or impossible to trade in the market. 
Firms with these kinds of resources may seek to deploy them in product markets through 
diversification.  
 
Diversification and Human Resources  
 One general extension of the resource-based view of the firm is that intangible 
resources, such as knowledge, are more likely to produce a sustainable competitive 
advantage than tangible resources (Hitt, Bierman, Shimizu, & Kochhar, 2001; Teece, 
Pisano, & Shuen, 1997), because other firms will find it more difficult to imitate firm-
specific processes associated with value creation (Lippman & Rumelt, 1982; Nelson and 
Winter 1982; Dierickx et al., 1989). Foremost among intangible resources are human 
resources: the accumulated skills of the firm’s employees in the context of the firm’s 
practices for organizing work. 
 The resource-based view suggests that human resources have implications for 
diversification strategy (Penrose 1959; Teece 1982; Montgomery and Hariharan 1991; 
Lei, Hitt and Bettis 1996). Most firm knowledge and other intangible resources reside in 
 3 
 
firm employees (Hitt et al. 2001). Firms can be expected to exploit these resources. To 
the extent that it serves to leverage firm resources in other market segments (Wernerfelt, 
1984), diversification has the potential to move a firm toward more extensive utilization 
of its human resources. This is especially true where human resources create knowledge 
and information, which from a perspective internal to the firm are quasi-public goods that 
can be exploited at close to zero marginal cost. 
 Despite their potential salience, previous studies have not directly assessed the 
extent to which human resources affect diversification strategies. As Farjoun (1994: 
p.187) noted, “empirical studies have primarily focused on R&D and advertising or other 
‘tangible’ assets, essentially avoiding the simple observation that business organizations 
ultimately consist of people.” For example, Chatterjee and Wernerfelt (1991) considered 
R&D and advertising intensity in predicting the types of market firms choose to enter, 
while Schoenecken and Cooper (1998) showed that R&D and marketing activities 
influence entry timing. Because they can be leveraged at low marginal cost, R&D and 
marketing capabilities are found to generate diversified expansion (Montgomery and 
Hariharan 1991). 
 The paucity of empirical research on human resources can be ascribed primarily 
to difficulties in measurement, particularly in measuring human capital (Steffy and 
Maurer 1988; Ichniowski, Shaw and Prennushi 1997). There are some hints that human 
resources matter. Studies of law firms indicated linkages between firm strategy and 
leverage of human resources (Sherer 1995) and between leverage and firm performance 
(Hitt et al. 2001). And Farjoun (1994) showed empirically that diversification across 
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industries was more likely where the industries had related “human resource profiles,” or 
clusters of occupations. 
 In this study we are able to take advantage of newly available data from the 
Census Bureau to extend our understanding of the relationship between human resources 
and diversification. LEHD data enable us to construct firm-level measures of human 
resources for a large sample of firms.  These data allow us to investigate empirically the 
connections between firm resources – specifically, human resources – and subsequent 
diversification activity of firms. 
 
Deregulation and Diversification: Financial Services  
 Our study is set in the U.S. financial services sector. This sector is an especially 
good venue for examination of the effects of human resources on diversification. Until 
recently, regulation constrained firms from a full range of diversification activity; many 
of these regulatory constraints disappeared over the course of the 1990s. This meant that 
firms developed human resources over a period in which diversification activity was 
limited; the relaxation of those limits therefore provides us with an opportunity to assess 
the extent to which human resources are associated with subsequent diversification 
activity. 
 U.S. firms were long prevented from engaging in activities across sub-sectors of 
financial services, primarily by regulation associated with the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933. 
The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 formally removed a large set of regulatory 
restrictions on banks by explicitly permitting financial “holding companies” (and their 
subsidiary firms) to participate in brokerage activities, underwriting, and the provision of 
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financial advice.2 This deregulation occurred to some extent after the fact; U.S. banks had 
been expanding their business beyond lending and deposits and toward provision of a 
broader set of financial services for years prior to the passage of Gramm-Leach-Bliley. In 
fact, deregulation began in earnest in the late 1980s, when the Federal Reserve Board 
began allowing commercial banks to enter the investment banking industry – first 
allowing commercial banks to underwrite corporate bonds in 1989, for example (Gande, 
Puri, and Saunders, 1999), so that by the early 1990s commercial banks began to gain a 
meaningful share of the investment banking market.  
 Cross-sectoral activity represents one mode of diversification in financial 
services. A second mode is geographic. While in some sectors (such as brokerage and 
insurance firms) firms have operated on a national scale for some time, this was not true 
in other sectors, particularly in the banking industry, where various kinds of regulation 
restricted geographic diversification. Prior to 1970, for example, branch banking even 
within state boundaries was somewhat limited, and all states prohibited interstate 
branching.3
 Over the following two decades, restrictions on intrastate and interstate branching 
gradually eased. Intrastate deregulation first allowed holding companies to own multiple 
banks, then allowed these holding companies to integrate these banks as members of a 
single branch system. In 1975, Maine provided the first opportunities for interstate 
banking, by allowing holding companies from other states to acquire banks in Maine. 
Over the 1980s, many states established arrangements in which their banks could be 
bought by banks from either selected states or all other states. In 1994, Congress passed 
                                                 
2 See Fay (2000) for a discussion of Gramm-Leach-Bliley.  
3 See Kroszner and Strahan (1999) for a more complete discussion of the timing and effects of the 
geographic deregulation of banking. 
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the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act, allowing full interstate 
banking, and by 1997 all states but Texas and Montana (each of which passed legislation 
opting out of Riegle-Neal) permitted complete interstate banking. 
 Deregulation was accompanied by mergers and acquisitions. Over the late 1980s 
and 1990s, large firms acquired smaller ones, expanding their reach across both 
geography and scope of activities. The overall sweep of deregulation in the 1990s 
allowed firms to operate nationally and across many financial sectors for the first time in 
several decades. To take one example: in 1998 Citicorp anticipated Gramm-Leach-Bliley 
by merging with Travelers Group, itself the result of acquisitions and mergers of such 
businesses as the investment banks Salomon Inc., Smith Barney, and Drexel Burnham 
Lambert, Travelers Life and Annuity in insurance, the property and casualty divisions of 
Aetna, and the retail brokerage and asset management operations of Shearson Lehman. 
By 2004, Citigroup had credit card customers in every U.S. state and its expansive branch 
banking network served retail customers in 22 states. 
  
Diversification, and Human Resources in Internal Labor Markets 
 The deregulation wave of the 1980s and 1990s opened up previously non-existent 
opportunities for diversification. The mergers, acquisitions, and greenfield growth that 
produced these increasingly diversified firms reflect firms’ searches for new customers 
and enhanced market power. But this begs the question: which firms were likely to 
diversify? 
 Our framework suggests that firm resources could play an important role in 
determining diversification strategy. Specifically, we have suggested that firms with 
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greater intangible assets in the form of human resources are more likely than others to 
seek to leverage these assets through diversification.  These intangible assets include 
firm-specific skills. As Montgomery and Wernerfelt (1988) noted, sources of value that 
are not firm-specific are insufficient to allow firms to enter industries where more 
specialized factors are required. While general skills can create value, these values do not 
sustain competitive advantage or create valuable resources that yield economic rents, 
because they are freely tradeable. Tradeability thus has clear implications for 
diversification strategy: the value of nontradeable assets, or resources, cannot be realized 
in factor markets. In order to tap their rent earning potential, owners of such assets must 
deploy them in product markets (Dierickx and Cool, 1989). Similarly, Montgomery and 
Wernerfelt (1988) note, following Williamson (1985), that standard theory suggests that 
value arising from firm-specific skills will be deployed internally, and that such 
circumstances should be associated with diversification. 
 We suggest that firms whose human resources reflect greater levels of firm-
specific skills and capabilities are more likely to diversify. For two reasons, these firms 
are likely to be those with robust internal labor markets (ILMs). First, internal labor 
markets encourage the development of firm-specific skills. Firm-specific skills are 
especially important because they are more likely than general skills to be associated with 
the slack resources that diversification seeks to exploit.  Second, firms with strong 
internal labor markets are more likely to have valuable human-resource derived 
intangible resources and capabilities beyond the skills of the workers themselves: team-
level, unit-level, and organizational knowledge, and accumulated social capital (Cappelli, 
2004). This reasoning leads us to hypothesize that firms with stronger ILMs are more 
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likely to diversify subsequently. Such diversification may take two forms: operating in a 
more extended geographic range and offering services in more sub-sectors of financial 
services. 
   
Data sources 
The Longitudinal Business Database (LBD) 
 We draw our diversification measures in the industry from the LBD, for which a 
detailed description is available in Jarmin and Miranda (2002).  A few points about its 
construction are useful here.  The LBD is created by linking data from annual business 
register files.  The Census Bureau's business register, the Standard Statistical 
Establishment List (SSEL), is a continuously updated database of basic information about 
all employer business establishments in the U.S., and the Center for Economic Studies 
maintains annual snapshot SSEL files from 1975 onward.  Currently, the LBD contains 
very good longitudinal linkages for all employer business establishments in the U.S. from 
1975 to 2000.  These linkages provide an exact measure of establishment age for all 
establishments born after 1975.  The LBD contains basic information on establishment 
employment, payroll, location, industrial classification and firm affiliation.  The LBD 
contains numeric establishment identifiers that allow it to easily be matched to other 
Census Bureau establishment level datasets that contain more detailed survey based 
information. The LBD also contains numeric firm identifiers that allow researchers to 
aggregate the establishment level data up to the company level. We make use of this 
approach in this paper. 
 
The Longitudinal Employer-Household Dynamics (LEHD) Program 
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 We also exploit new Census Bureau data from the LEHD Program. The LEHD 
Program integrates information from state unemployment insurance data and Census 
Bureau economic and demographic data in a manner that permits the construction of 
longitudinal information on workforce composition at the firm level.  This Program 
represents a substantial investment made by the Census Bureau in order to permit direct 
linking of its demographic surveys (household-based instruments) with its economic 
censuses and surveys (business and business unit-based surveys). 
 The unemployment insurance (UI) wage records are discussed elsewhere (see 
Burgess, Lane and Stevens, 2000).  Every state in the U.S., through its Employment 
Security Agency, collects quarterly employment and earnings information to manage its 
unemployment compensation program.  These data enable us to construct quarterly 
longitudinal information on employees.  The advantages of UI wage record data are 
numerous.  The data are frequent, longitudinal, and potentially universal.  The sample 
size is generous and reporting for many data items is more accurate than survey based 
data.  The advantage of having a universe as opposed to a sample is that movements of 
individuals to different employers and their consequences for earnings can be tracked.  It 
is also possible to construct longitudinal data using the employer as the unit of analysis. 
 Perhaps the main drawback of the UI wage record data is the lack of even the 
most basic demographic information on workers (Burgess, Lane and Stevens 2000).  
Links to Census Bureau data overcome this for two reasons.  First, individual wage 
records can be integrated with administrative data at the Census Bureau containing 
information such as date of birth, place of birth, and gender for almost all the workers in 
the data.  Second, LEHD staff have exploited the longitudinal and universal nature of the 
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dataset to develop measures of workforce quality using the methodology described in 
detail in Abowd, Creecy and Kramarz (2002) and in Abowd, Lengermann and McKinney 
(2003). 
 The LEHD Program now houses data from more than thirty states.4 In this paper, 
however, our attention to the role of internal labor markets in accounting for the 
evolution of diversification in the financial services in the 1990s requires extensive 
LEHD data from the early 1990s. We have data on all establishments and all firms in the 
financial services sector (defined precisely below) in the LBD from 1992 through 2000. 
We also have LEHD data on all establishments and all firms in the financial services 
sector for three large selected states.  The crosswalk between these files is based on a 
common business-level identifier and the match rate between these files is extremely 
high. 
Diversification in Financial Services 
 We investigate geographic and industry diversification in the U.S. financial 
services industry.  We focus on financial services because of the unique opportunities that 
deregulation of the industry presented in the 1990s.   The deregulation of the industry acts 
as a form of a natural experiment during our sample period – that is, financial services 
firms saw the opportunity set change dramatically in response to regulatory changes that 
can for our purposes be viewed as exogenous.   Our analysis explores which firms 
changed their diversification in response to this deregulation as a function of the ILM 
structure of the firm. 
                                                 
4  See http://lehd.dsd.census.gov/led/00/index.html for more information. 
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 Table 1 lists the 4-digit 1987 SIC codes we used to identify establishments in 
financial services, and in both the LBD and LEHD data we can measure activity at the 
establishment-level.  Our analysis of diversification, however, is conducted at the firm-
level, and thus we aggregate our establishment activity to construct firm measures. The 
Census Bureau maintains firm corporate structure of all establishments in the U.S. using 
a definition of operational control, giving a common identifier to any establishment under 
the operational control of a parent firm.  In what follows, we exploit this rich 
characterization of the corporate structure to determine financial services firms - all the 
financial services establishments under a common firm identifier. Put differently, we 
focus on only the financial services components of firms.5  We define a financial services 
firm as a firm-year observation comprising establishments in any of the 4-digit SIC 
industries listed in Table 1, in the firm in that year.  We create diversification measures 
for these financial services firms based on LBD data for the period 1992-2000 (though 
our analysis of diversification will focus on the period 1997-2000). 
 Table 2 shows counts of single- and multi-unit financial services firms (hereafter 
firms) for the U.S. over the period 1992-2000, drawn from the LBD data for all 50 states 
plus the District of Columbia. The number of single-unit firms grew by over 20% during 
this period, even as the number of multi-unit firms in financial services dropped by more 
than 10% in the same time frame. The drop in multi-unit firms is attributable to the 
substantial pace of consolidation activity between medium- and large-sized firms in the 
                                                 
5 Note that large firms that are not thought of primarily as financial services firms (for example, auto 
companies) may have substantial financial services components.  We have examined the diversification 
measures using all components of the firms (including the non-financial services components) and we 
obtain similar basic patterns.  However, given that the deregulation in the financial services industry 
primarily impacted the financial services components of firms, we focus on the financial services 
components only. 
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industry. Table 3 shows establishment counts over the same period, indicating that the 
number of establishments in both single- and multi-unit firms grew over the period, with 
slightly higher growth among the establishments that did not belong to multi-unit firms. 
Table 4 shows that the relatively small share of multi-unit firms in the sector account for 
the vast share of sector activity: over 80% of both employment and payroll are 
represented by multi-unit firms. 
 We create five different diversification measures: three simple measure of overall 
diversification, and two measures of relatedness in diversification.  The simpler measures 
are equal to one minus a basic Herfindahl index: industry diversification (ind_div); 
county diversification (county_div); and state diversification (state_div).  We also use 
weighting to account for the role of larger establishments in diversification activity. LBD 
data for payroll are quite reliable and thus we prefer payroll-weighting to employment-
weighting. We construct all measures using payroll weights (in the aggregate, 
employment and payroll, as Table 4 suggests, represent roughly similar shares of 
activity).  
 We illustrate the construction of the measure for industry diversification. We 
calculate total payroll (payit) for firm i in year t, the total payroll (payjit) for 
establishments (e) operating in industry j in firm i in year t, and the payroll share (sjit)for 
establishments operating in industry j in firm i in year t. 
 
∑
∈
=
ie
eitit paypay  ∑
∈∩∈
=
jeie
eitjit paypay   
it
jit
jit pay
pay
s =  
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We use these measures to create basic Herfindahl indices (in this case, payroll-industry) 
for firm i in year t. 
 ( )∑
∈
=
ij
jit
industry
it sH
2
From this measure we create our index, ind_div, for firm i in year t.6
industry
itit Hdivind −= 1_  
County and state diversification are calculated similarly.  
 We also calculate measures of relatedness in diversification, using distance-based 
diversification indices weighted by payroll. We call these measures geog_dist_div for 
geographic diversification and ind_dist_div for industry diversification.  For these 
measures, we also begin by calculating payroll and payroll shares. With respect to 
geography, we then proceed to identify the “core” county (c) of firm i in year t.  The 
“core” county is defined as the county with the highest payroll share in firm i in year t.  
From here, we create the following diversification index: 
  ( )∑
∈
=
ie
eitce
county
it sdH
2)/1(
where dce is 1 + the distance from the center of the county where establishment e is 
located and the “core” county c. This enables the construction of the variable 
geog_dist_div for firm i in year t. 
county
itit Hdivdistgeog −= 1__  
For our “distance”-based diversification index weighted by payroll for industry, 
we also calculate total payroll (payit) and payroll share. We then proceed to identify the 
                                                 
6 Our measurement approach to diversification follows in the spirit of Gollop and Monahan (1991) both for 
the basic measures and the distance-relatedness measures of diversification. 
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“core” industry (j) of firm i in year t.  The “core” industry is defined as the industry with 
the highest payroll share in firm i in year t. From here, we create the diversification index 
 ( )∑
∈
=
ie
eitje
industry
it sdH
2)/1(
where 1 if firm i operates only in one 4-digit industry, 2 if establishment e operates 
in the same 3-digit industry as the firm “core” industry j, 3 if establishment e operates in 
the same 2-digit industry as the firm “core” industry j, and 4 otherwise. This enables the 
creation of the ind_dist_div diversification index for firm i in year t: 
=jed
industry
itit Hdivdistind −= 1__  
All diversification measures are bounded in the interval [0,1] and are equal to 0 for 
single-unit and other completely non-diversified firms. 
 Figure 1 shows the annual mean of all five firm-level diversification measures 
weighted by the total payroll of the firm for multi-unit firms (Table 5 shows the data for 
each measure for key years in this period in more detail).  Average diversification levels 
of the firms in each of our five indices show modest growth for the period 1992-2000, 
consistent with the stylized facts for the sector. Firm-level geographic diversification, 
whether measured at the county or the state level, and industry diversification, are highest 
at the end of the period. Firms also appear to be decreasing the extent to which their 
activities are related; the distance indices by geography and by industry are also higher at 
the end of the period.   
Our analytical strategy will be to focus on changes in firm diversification for the 
period 1997-2000, enabling us to use data on the characteristics of firms’ internal labor 
markets from the period preceding this window.  Moreover, our focus on 1997-2000 
 15 
 
implies that we are examining changes from perspective pre- and post-passage of the 
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act.  We earlier noted that some aspects of deregulation, and 
considerable diversification activity, clearly pre-date the Act.  Figures 1 and 2, however, 
show that over the 1997-2000 period the trends in the industry continue to point toward 
increasingly diversified organizations, operating over increasingly distant geographies 
and across somewhat less related industries.  
 The composition of our sample of firms changes over time as a result of entry and 
exit activity. From our sample, we define long-term continuing firms as firms that appear 
in the sample for every year from 1992-2000.  There are 79,840 single-unit and 10,192 
multi-unit long-term continuer financial services firms. Figure 2 displays all five firm-
level diversification measures weighted by the total payroll of the firm for long-term 
continuer multi-unit firms. Over the period we are studying, the long-term continuers in 
the sample show greater increases in diversification levels by the various measures, a fact 
that is also consistent with our account of existing firms’ pursuit of increasingly 
diversified activities in the 1990s (again, see Table 5 for more detail). 
 While the mean level of diversification in financial services increased by any 
measure over our period, firms did not follow identical strategies. Perhaps not 
surprisingly, most firms experience little change in their diversification levels over the 
period. Our sample is, however, characterized by considerable heterogeneity in strategies 
even over the relatively short time window we have chosen, and includes not only firms 
with varying levels of diversifications, but firms that decreased as well as increased their 
range of activities both geographically and sectorally. Examination of plots of 
diversification measures for both 1997 and 2000 helps to make this clearer, as shown in 
Figure 3. 
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We can further consider firm diversification strategies by decomposing changes in 
the various measures of diversification, separating the roles of continuers from changes 
generated by firm entry and exit. Let the aggregate weighted average of firm-level index 
be given by: 
∑=
i
ititt DD θ  
where Dt is the share-weighted average diversification index,  Dit is the diversification 
index for firm  i, and θit is the share of firm i.  Consider the following decomposition:
 
)DD()DD(+ 
 D+ )D(D+D=D
tititXitititNi
ititCiittitCiititCit
1111
11
                        −−−∈−∈
∈−∈−∈
−∑−−∑
∆∆∑∆−∑∆∑∆
θθ
θθθ
 
The sets C, N, and X respectively represent the set of continuing firms, entering firms, 
and exiting firms.  This decomposition involves four terms: a within-firm effect, a 
between-firm effect, a cross effect, and a net entry effect.  We define firm entry and exit 
in terms of changes in the firm identification code, and as such, a firm that is acquired 
will result in an “exit” of a firm.  In what follows, since our firm-level diversification 
measures are based upon using payroll as a measure of activity, we use firm shares of 
total industry payroll as weights in the aggregation and decomposition. 
 Decomposition of changes in our measures for the period 1997-2000 clearly 
reveals that the increase in diversification levels over this period is generated by 
continuing firms. Figure 4a shows that most of the activity in our sample takes place in 
continuing firms, but that entry and exit are substantial. Of the firms in the 1997 sample, 
about 20% (by payroll weight) exit over the period, while entrants in the 1997-2000 
period account for only about 10% of the payroll weight in 2000. As Figure 4b shows, 
continuing firms increased their diversification levels over this period, while net entry 
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actually generated a decline, and activity among continuers was especially prominent for 
diversification across state boundaries. 
 The decline attributable to net entry reflects mainly the fact that entrants to the 
industry tend not to be diversified (consistent with the resource-based view, these firms 
have few specific resources to leverage). While firms that exit are less diversified than 
the firms that continue, entrants are even less diversified than exiters, so the impact of net 
entry is negative.  We find it striking that continuing businesses exhibit a pronounced 
increase in diversification over the 1997-2000 period.  Figure 4c provides a fuller 
characterization of the dynamics of continuing firms by showing all of the components of 
the above decomposition.  We find that the within terms (changes at the firm level 
weighted by initial shares) and especially the between terms (changes in the shares 
weighted by initial diversification) are both positive for all measures.  Thus, the 
contribution of continuers arises both because the average continuing firm exhibited an 
increase in diversification and also because the firms that were already highly diversified 
in 1997 increased their share of activity.   
 
Human Resources in Internal Labor Markets  
Basic concepts and measurement 
 In this section we turn our attention from basic facts on diversification to our 
measures of human resources in internal labor markets. The LEHD data do not permit us 
to observe firm practices directly; rather, we have indicators of internal labor market 
outcomes that result from internal firm processes and practices. The LEHD data allow us 
to construct a number of indicators of the strength of firm-level internal labor markets 
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and thus of firm resources. Each of these measures can be thought of as an outcome of 
ILMs, and likely to be associated with the resources that diversification seeks to exploit. 
We focus on three indicators of internal labor markets derived from the LEHD data: firm-
level “churning” (worker turnover rates in excess of net changes); the extent to which 
wage-tenure profiles at firms slope upward; and the dispersion of wages within firms.  
We construct these measures initially at the establishment-level and then aggregate the 
measures to the firm level using appropriate employment weights. 
 First, consider the role of worker turnover in this context.  The sorts of firm-
specific skills that can be leveraged through diversification are likely to be acquired on 
the job, in firms that have relatively low worker turnover (Fairris, 2004). Moreover, it has 
long been argued that low quit rates are one feature of firms with strong internal labor 
markets (Doeringer and Piore, 1971). In this paper we look specifically at worker 
“churning.”  We measure worker churning at the establishment-level as: 
( )
)1,(_ −
∆−+
ttEmploymentAverage
EmploymentsSeparationAccessions
 
 This measure captures the component of worker turnover or reallocation that is in 
excess of that needed to accommodate any net changes in the number of workers in the 
business.  We have this measure on a quarterly frequency for every establishment, and 
aggregate it to an annual firm level by taking appropriate employment-weighted 
averages.   We expect that firms with high mean rates of worker churning (chr) are less 
likely to accumulate firm-specific skills over time. Firms with relatively low churn rates, 
in contrast, are more likely to develop the sorts of skills that can be leveraged through 
diversification. 
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 A second important aspect of internal labor markets is that they comprise 
opportunities to advance inside the firm. Such advancement is also conducive to the 
development of resources that can be leveraged through diversification. We do not have 
specific measures of advancement through job ladders, often seen as a key feature of 
internal labor markets (Pfeffer and Cohen, 1984), but the LEHD data allow us to 
construct a proxy for these kinds of opportunities through the identification of wage-
tenure profiles inside the firm. Workers in firms with relatively strong internal labor 
markets are likely to have wage-tenure profiles that slope more sharply upward within the 
firm, as they are rewarded for seniority with higher-ranking and better-paying jobs. 
 Our second indicator of the strength of the firm’s internal labor market is the 
mean growth of workers’ wages over their period of employment. The LEHD data allow 
us to construct a profile of the “within-job-wage-growth” (wjwg) for each establishment 
in the firm. We focus on the five year period preceding 1997, taking the mean wage gains 
of all newly hired workers who begin spells of employment during the period 1992-1996, 
inclusive, and who have tenure for five or more years.  In other words, our measure wjwg 
gives the average firm wage-tenure profile, built from the first five years of individual 
workers’ tenure at the firm conditional on tenure lasting for at least five years. 
 A third feature of many internal labor markets is wage compression. Firms with 
strong internal labor markets are likely to feature less dispersion of wages across workers 
with similar jobs and skill levels. In internal labor markets, wages are set in part by 
bureaucratic rules and may not perfectly reflect forces in the external market. Such rules 
may reflect norms of equity, or arise for reasons of administrative convenience. Freeman 
(1982), for example, shows that unionized firms are more likely to feature wage 
compression for observationally equal workers, and unionization is also associated with 
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the existence of strong internal labor markets (Kalleberg et al. 1996). Pfeffer and Langton 
(1993) show that wage compression is positively related to cooperation among workers. 
Such cooperation provides opportunities to build individual-specific skills, and has 
further effects because firm knowledge is embedded not simply in individuals’ skills, but 
in “routines” (Nelson and Winter, 1992) and in relationships between individuals (Kogut 
and Zander, 1992). Routines and social capital are not transferred easily to other 
organizations; firms with valuable capabilities in these areas may seek to leverage them 
through diversification. Our measure of within-firm wage dispersion (diff) is the ratio of 
earnings of the worker at the 90th percentile in the firm to that of the worker at the 10th 
percentiles (expressed in logarithmic form). 
 The effects of these different aspects of internal labor markets on subsequent 
diversification may also be complementary. For example, if a relatively small number of 
workers stay with the firm long enough to accumulate skills, the effects of steep wage 
profiles may be less than if most workers tend to remain at the firm. Thus high rates of 
turnover (or our measure, churning) may tend to dampen the effects of high levels of 
wage growth. Similar reasoning applies to wage dispersion. We suggested that low levels 
of wage dispersion, particularly controlling for human capital, are more likely to be 
associated with skill development and accumulation of social capital that can be 
leveraged through diversification. This relationship should be stronger in firms with 
relatively low rates of turnover. Finally, we also expect the relationship between wage 
dispersion and steep wage profiles to be complementary. We expect that the negative 
effects of wage dispersion should be dampened by steeper wage profiles. That is, 
dispersion in firms where individuals have the opportunity to make wage gains should 
not have the same kinds of negative effects on skill accumulation, cooperation, and social 
 21 
 
capital as would dispersion in firms in which individuals do not have these kinds of 
opportunities.  
 Our approach will be to use measures of these indicators, constructed at the level 
of the firm, to predict subsequent firm-level diversification activity. The underlying 
premise here is that internal labor markets in financial service firms developed over time, 
perhaps in part as human resources strategies consciously chosen, in part as responses to 
institutional pressures, and in part due to idiosyncratic factors (which may have in turn 
induced firms to adopt alternative human resource practices).  While we clearly recognize 
that firm-level differences in our indicators of ILMs are driven by many possible factors 
and inherently endogenous, our empirical strategy is to take advantage of the changes in 
the regulatory environment to identify the impact of ILMs on diversification.  That is, in 
the 1990s deregulation and technological changes provided new opportunities to firms.  
The open question is not whether or why financial services diversified on average but 
rather, which firms increased diversification.  Our working hypothesis is that the firms 
with well-established ILMs were in a better position to take advantage of these new 
opportunities, and thus we use the 1992-1996 outcomes of ILM processes at the firm 
level to predict changes in firm-level diversification activity in the 1997-2000 period. It 
is, of course, the case that deregulation and diversification began prior to 1997, but our 
approach is designed to relate changes from t to t+k based upon initial conditions in 
period t. 
 We use another set of variables to control for other firm characteristics, both those 
related to general features of the firm, and those related to human resources. Firm size 
(lnsize) is measured by the average employment (in logs) of the firm (restricted, as noted 
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above, to the financial services establishments of that firm) from 1992-96.7  Firm growth 
is measured by average quarterly employment growth over the period 1992-96 and firm 
age (firmage1997) is measured by the age in years of the oldest establishment in the firm 
as of 1997.  Because longitudinal firm linkages are currently under development, exact 
measures of firm age are not yet available on the LBD.  However, other work at CES 
(Becker et. al. 2004 and Davis et. al. 2004) has shown that using the age of the oldest 
establishment owned by a firm is a very good approximation. We control for the “home” 
state of each firm: our LEHD data are taken from three large states and we include 
dummy variables indicating which of the three states employs the largest share of 
employees. We also control for the chief sub-industry in which in each firm operates, 
including dummy variables for the 4-digit industries listed in Table 1 which take on a 
value of “1” for the sub-industry employing the largest share of the firm’s workers, and a 
value of “0” otherwise. We control for these features of our firms since each might 
plausibly be related both to internal labor market characteristics and to diversification. 
 The LEHD data also allow us to control for other demographic features of sample 
firms’ workforces. We control for the share of female workers, shr_fem, taken from the 
LEHD data. We also control for the firm’s employment of high-skilled workers by 
including a measure for the share of high-skill workers, shr_high, derived from the 
LEHD data, and based upon the measures of workforce quality developed by Abowd et. 
al. (2003).  The workforce quality measures are based upon a statistical decomposition of 
the wage for a worker into a person effect, a firm effect and time varying person 
characteristics including general labor market experience.  The person effect is the 
                                                 
7 In this draft, figures in Tables 7 and 8 refer to employment only in the three LEHD states. Estimates in the 
regression models reported in Tables 9, 10, and 11 refer to national employment levels. Subsequent drafts 
will use the national figures in all tables. 
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portable component of a worker’s wage and as such is a good summary measure of the 
general skills of a worker (and indeed studies have show that it is highly correlated with 
direct measures of skills such as education). Using this person effect, we construct 
summary measures of the skill distribution of the firm based upon the fraction of workers 
the firm has in the quintiles of the person effect distribution (where the quintile thresholds 
are based upon all workers in the financial services sector).  
 All of these measures of workforce quality and workforce composition are 
controls that help in the interpretation of the ILM measures.  Our measure of within firm 
wage dispersion, for example, might be thought to reflect differences in the mix of 
workers at the firm. Controlling for workforce composition implies we are capturing the 
variation across firms in our ILM measures holding these composition measures constant.  
In effect, we are able to examine internal labor market effects controlling for general 
skills; this is consistent with our theoretical argument that rests on the effects of firm-
specific skills and cooperation. 
 We construct these measures for all establishments, and aggregate them to the 
firm level for all establishments in the three large states for which we have these 
measures for the 1992-96 period.  While we have constructed these measures for all 
firms, in what follows much of the analysis focuses on financial services firms that have 
at least five employees (cumulatively) in our three states.  While we have found that our 
empirical results are robust to the inclusion of all firms, many of our measures (e.g., 
churning, dispersion) are inherently noisy for very small firms (e.g., a firm with one 
worker).   
In matching our ILM firm-level measures from the LEHD to the LBD 
diversification measures, we focus on firms that have at least one establishment in our 
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LEHD states.  However, it should be emphasized that the diversification measures we use 
for these firms are the national diversification measures.  We are thus using the ILM 
measures from these three states, derived from the observed dynamics of workers and 
firms for the period 1992-1996, as proxies for the ILM behavior for the entire national 
firm.8
 
Basic Facts about ILMs 
 There is substantial heterogeneity across firms in the measures we have chosen to 
represent outcomes of ILMs.  Figure 5 reports scatter plots of the churning measure, the 
within firm wage tenure profiles, and within firm wage dispersion. There is evidence for 
heterogeneity of each measure. For churning, there is substantial mass from very low 
rates up to a rate of 0.5 (a fifty percent turnover rate abstracting from net growth is very 
large). There is substantial mass of wage-tenure profiles from slightly negative to more 
than 20 percent, and there is substantial mass in the 90-10 log differential from just above 
zero to more than 400 log points. 
We first ask whether our measures are likely to characterize consistent aspects of 
firm strategy and human resource policies. If these indicators vary considerably from 
year to year, they are likely to be poor representations of internal labor markets or the 
development of specific skills and capabilities. If, on the other hand, the measures are 
reasonably stable over the period, then it is more likely that they are capturing some firm-
level approach to human resources. The scatter plots demonstrate that there is substantial 
persistence in each of the measures, suggesting that the variation we have detected 
                                                 
8 In future drafts, we plan on examining the behavior of those firms that have most of their activity in our 
three states as a robustness check.  However, even in this case, the national diversification of the firm is 
clearly the issue of interest. 
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reflects part of the firm’s long run approach to human resources. Because the variables 
indicate relatively consistent aspects of firm-level internal labor markets, we reduce the 
complexity of our analysis by constructing new variables for each indicator by taking the 
annual mean level of each of our measures for the period 1992-1996.  Variable names 
and their definitions are summarized in Table 6. 
Tables 7 and 8 report summary statistics for our sample on both weighted and 
unweighted bases, as well as correlations between the variables.  In what follows, we 
focus on analysis on a weighted basis.  For our three key ILM measures, the weighted 
statistics show an average churning rate of around 9 percent, an average within firm wage 
tenure profile over the first five years of tenure of 9 log points, and an average within 
firm wage differential of 160 log points.  Consistent with the scatter plots in Figure 5, the 
reported standard deviations show substantial variation.  It is also worth noting that the 
average firm has about 63 workers in the unweighted sample but the employment-
weighted average is over 3000. Thus, the average worker in the financial services sector 
works at a very large firm even though the average firm is relatively small.    
 Tables 7 and 8 also show that many of our control variables are strongly 
correlated.  In the analysis to follow, we control only for gender composition and 
workforce quality, but here we also show the correlations with more basic measures such 
as the share of high wage workers. The latter is highly correlated with the share of high 
skill workers and inversely correlated with the share of low skill workers and the share of 
female workers.  These correlations in controls suggest caution in interpreting the effects 
of any single control variable in subsequent multivariate models.  
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We also find that several of our control variables are associated with our internal 
labor market indicators: wage profiles are steeper in firms with lower shares of female 
workers, and steeper in firms with relatively more workers with high levels of human 
capital. Wage dispersion is also positively correlated with the share of high-human 
capital workers. Churning is higher in firms that employ smaller shares of high-human 
capital workers. Churning is also negatively associated with net growth; that is, growing 
firms tend to have lower churn rates. 
 The relationships between the internal labor market variables suggest that the 
three indicators do not represent a single construct. Churning and wage dispersion are 
positively correlated; that is, firms with higher turnover rates tend to be those with greater 
wage dispersion. But firms with relatively steep wage profiles also tend to have slightly 
higher rates of churn, and considerably more wage dispersion. This is not necessarily 
surprising: Fairris (2004), for example, shows that quit rates are actually increased by 
internal opportunities in circumstances where workers compete for such opportunities 
rather than having them awarded on the basis of seniority. Seniority-based opportunities, 
on the other hand, may be more characteristic of the ideal-type labor markets described 
by Doeringer and Piore (1971) featuring lower levels of wage dispersion.  
 Thus our indicators represent different aspects of internal labor markets, and are 
not necessarily associated with one another in practice. The data do not support an 
interpretation in which we would combine these indicators into a single scale 
representing the overall effects of a strong internal labor market. Instead, we investigate 
whether each indicator may have its own effects on the development of firm-level 
resources that lend themselves to leveraging through diversification. We then turn to a 
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consideration of complementarity which focuses on the effects of internal labor markets 
rather than on the adoption of practices. 
 
Analysis 
 Our analytical strategy is to estimate OLS equations with the changes between 
1997 and 2000 in the various measures of diversification as dependent variables. As 
independent variables, we use the constructed five-year means of our internal labor 
market and control variables. Recall that these means are estimated for the years 1992-
1996, fully preceding any subsequent changes in diversification levels. We weight 
observations by payroll in all estimated models. 
 Table 9 reports results from a control model, before estimation of the variables of 
interest. (For simplicity we do not report the state and industry dummies.) Examining the 
overall fit of these models shows clearly that most of the change in diversification levels 
over the period is attributable to factors we have not measured. The goodness of fit is 
somewhat similar for each of the measures; cross-industry diversification has a 
considerably worse fit, and state diversification a somewhat better fit; the other three are 
roughly similar.  The overall explanatory power of the models is reasonable for firm level 
cross sectional regressions, especially given that the dependent variables are changes in 
the measure of interest.  
 As we have noted, there are high correlations amongst the controls so we interpret 
the results in Table 9 with some caution.  We chose to operationalize age by dividing the 
sample into four cohorts; this provided a better fit than a linear specification. “Middle-
aged” firms (11-20 years old) are more likely to have positive changes in county-level 
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and industry-level diversification over the period; other effects of age are insignificant. 
Firm size (as measured by number of workers) is negatively associated with changes in 
diversification levels by any of our measures.  This result may indicate some inertia 
associated with large firms; it is also true that larger firms are more diversified and thus 
start from a higher baseline level in 1997 so we may be capturing a catch-up effect.9  
 Results for average growth rate are mixed. Firms that grew extensively in the 
period 1992-1996 tend to increase their diversification levels as indicated by distance 
measures, but growth in this earlier period is actually negatively related to the 
unweighted changes across state boundaries. It is possible that firms that experienced 
growth during the earlier period may already have begun to diversify before 1997 and 
that subsequent changes indicate further expansion into the areas that were entered in the 
earlier period. 
 Holding other factors fixed, the share of “high human capital” workers is 
negatively associated with changes in diversification levels for three out of the five 
measures. This is not inconsistent with our theoretical perspective, which suggests that 
human resources are likely to be leveraged through diversification where they carry firm-
specific value that cannot be realized in other ways. This human capital indicator is a 
measure of general skills, and thus firms may not have opportunities to exploit such skills 
through diversification.  Interestingly, we find that, again holding other factors fixed, a 
higher share of female workers is associated with a greater increase in diversification.  
We offer no ready interpretation of this latter finding; we included this measure of 
                                                 
9 We have also estimated models using other specifications for firm size (including groupings and more 
complex non-linear functions). Some alternatives result in slightly improved fit. The basic findings both 
with respect to our study variables and with respect to the negative effect of size are robust.  
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workforce composition as a control variable.  The impact here, however, is large enough 
that this finding is worthy of more investigation.10  
 In Table 10 we present results for models which include the control variables and 
our main variables of interest.  Results for the internal labor market variables are 
consistent with our hypothesized relationships, and F-tests suggest that the three 
indicators contribute to the fit of each of the five models.  Results for the control 
variables are relatively stable in comparison to Table 9 (there are some changes in the 
estimates for age effects, suggesting relationships between internal labor markets and 
firm age). 
 Table 10 shows that each of the three measures of internal labor market strength is 
significantly associated with changes in each of the diversification indices, and the 
relationships are in the expected direction. Churning, our measure of net turnover, is 
negatively associated with changes in diversification by all five measures; four of these 
are statistically significant. More extensive wage differentials are also negatively 
associated with subsequent diversification, and the effects are statistically significant with 
respect to all five of our diversification measures. And steepness of wage profiles is 
positively associated with changes in diversification in each of the five models. 
 In terms of the magnitudes of the effects, the effects we have detected are 
important but account for a relatively small fraction of the variation in the distribution of 
changes in diversification.  For each of our diversification change measures, a one 
standard deviation change is about 0.15.  The coefficient estimates from Table 10 and the 
summary statistics from Tables 7 and 8 imply that a one standard deviation change in 
                                                 
10  For example, the share of female workers may be a proxy for diversification in activities on other 
dimensions (e.g., more likely to have part time workers, more likely to be in an urban area). 
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churning (of about .05) produces a change in the various dispersion change measures that 
ranges from about one-seventh of a standard deviation (for county-level geographic 
diversification) to about four percent of a standard deviation (for distance-weighted 
industry-level diversification).  Analogously, increasing the wage dispersion in a firm by 
one standard deviation (about .48) results in an increase in diversification growth that is 
between one-tenth (distance-weighted industry diversification) and one-fourth 
(unweighted industry diversification) of a standard deviation. Finally, a one standard 
deviation change in within-job wage growth (about .04) is linked to a change in 
diversification that ranges between one-fifth (county geographic diversification) and one-
tenth (state geographic diversification) of a standard deviation.  Again, while much of the 
variation remains unexplained, accounting for as much as a quarter of the standard 
deviation of the variation we are seeking to explain suggests that the effects we have 
captured are important.  
One interesting question is the role of distance or relatedness in this context.  The 
pattern of coefficients in Table 10 for county-based diversification changes shows that 
the diversification measure that weights by distance yields slightly smaller effects for 
wage-tenure profiles and churning than does the measure that does not weight by 
distance. The effects of wage compression are slightly larger. For the industry based 
measure, weighting the diversification measure for distance/relatedness yields a larger 
effect for churning; one that is statistically significant. The effects of wage-tenure profiles 
are only slightly larger; the effects of wage compression, smaller. Overall, the patterns 
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are similar enough that it is difficult to argue that the results hinge on weighting by 
distance or relatedness.11
The results in Table 10 are consistent with our resource-based view of 
diversification. Firms with low turnover, relative wage compression, and steep within-
firm wage profiles are likely to have the sorts of firm-specific resources that can be 
leveraged through diversification. The results are especially interesting in light of the 
results in Tables 7 and 8, which showed that steep wage profiles are actually associated 
with higher levels of churning and more wage dispersion inside the firm.  The results 
suggest that each of the three measures may indicate the development of firm-specific 
resources in internal labor markets, though firms that develop resources through worker 
retention and wage compression may not tend to be the same firms that have steep wage 
profiles. One possibility is that there may be two kinds of paths to the development of 
firm-level human resource capabilities: one that focuses on rewarding worker loyalty and 
cooperation; and a second which focuses on tournament-like structures that encourage 
worker effort (Lazear and Rosen, 1981). 
Next we turn our attention to possible complementarities between internal labor 
market indicators. Here our analytical strategy follows that of MacDuffie (1995), who 
argued that multiplicative interactions are one way to estimate complementary effects of 
different aspects of human resource and production practices. We form interaction terms 
between each pair of internal labor market indicators.  Before doing so, we subtract the 
mean value of each of the three indicators from each score, “centering” the variables. 
This procedure reduces multicollinearity without altering the structural relationships 
                                                 
11 In future drafts, we plan to pursue empirical exercises that will help us disentangle the role of 
diversification and distance/relatedness.  The current results should be viewed primarily as a robustness 
check on alternative measures of diversification. 
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among the variables, and allows straightforward interpretations of main effects in the 
same models that include interactions (Jaccard, Turisi, and Wan 1990). 
Results for interactions are displayed in Table 11. We estimated both models 
which added individual interaction terms to each of the models in Table 10, and models 
in which we entered all three terms simultaneously. In Table 11 we report only the 
estimates for the models including all three interaction terms. Results for models which 
added only one term at a time (available on request) were substantially similar. The 
effects of churning and wage profiles appear to depend on one another, and the 
interaction, as expected, is negative and significant for four of the five measures of 
change diversification (the exception is unweighted industry diversification). Churning 
and wage compression have complementary effects in the expected direction in three of 
the five models. The results least consistent with our expectations are those for the 
interaction between wage profiles and wage compression; while two of the five models 
suggest complementarity in the expected direction, two do not show statistically 
significant relationships, and one (for state diversification) has the opposite sign from the 
one we hypothesized. Overall, the results in Table 11 provide some support for our 
conjecture that internal labor market indicators would have complementary effects on 
changes in diversification. 
Discussion, Future Directions, and Conclusions 
We find that continuing firms in the financial services industries have 
substantially increased diversification in the latter half of the 1990s.  This increase in 
diversification is on both industrial and geographic dimensions.  The increased 
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diversification is not surprising given the changes in the regulations faced by financial 
services firms on both of these dimensions. 
Our analysis sought to identify characteristics of firms that increased 
diversification the most. We find substantial heterogeneity in the distribution of changes 
in diversification, suggesting that features of firms would help to account for this 
variation.  We have hypothesized that internal labor markets help firms to develop 
resources that can be exploited through diversification, and thus serve as a potential 
factor that would explain the variation.  We test this hypothesis by using outcomes of 
internal labor market processes for the first half of the 1990s to help predict which firms 
increased diversification the most in the second half of the 1990s. 
We find strong evidence in favor of this resource based view of diversification.  
Firms with strong internal labor markets as evidenced by steep wage-tenure profiles, low 
churning of workers and low within firm dispersion of wages increased diversification 
substantially more than their counterparts without these features.  While we explain a 
relatively small fraction of the overall variation in the distribution of changes in 
diversification, our results are economically important, robust and statistically significant. 
 We find mixed evidence with respect to the complementary effects of our three 
indicators of ILMs. The various aspects of strong internal labor markets do not 
necessarily “bundle” together to reflect a coherent package or system of practices. Wage 
profiles, turnover rates, and wage compression exist somewhat independently of one 
another. Yet our evidence does suggest that the impact of each of these different aspects 
of internal labor markets on subsequent diversification strategies depends in part on the 
other aspects; nine of the fifteen interactions we examined empirically were significant 
and ran in the direction our theory suggested. 
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 The findings suggest investigation of a second set of questions regarding the 
mode of diversification. Firms may increase their levels of diversification (whether 
geographic or sectoral) via two processes. They may diversify through acquisition of 
firms already operating in desired geographies or sectors. Alternatively, they may 
diversify through greenfield expansion: opening offices and branches in new 
geographies, or creating service offerings across sectors in which they previously did not. 
It seems possible that strong ILMs will be especially associated with greenfield 
expansion. While some existing resources must be deployed in order to integrate and 
manage acquisitions, more slack resources are required for pure entry into new markets. 
 Future analyses should also investigate factors that have the potential to moderate 
the above relationships. We looked at complementarity between aspects of ILMs. But 
there may be other relationships that also matter. For example, relationships between 
strong ILMs and diversification may be stronger where human resources are relatively 
more valuable. Thus ILMs for higher-skilled workers may be more closely associated 
with diversification strategies and directions than will ILMs for lower-skilled workers. 
Second, these relationships may vary with firm size. Firms are likely to be heterogeneous 
with respect not only to human resources but to other kinds of valuable resources. These 
slack resources may vary directly with firm size: larger firms are more likely to have 
slack resources that they can exploit through diversification. It is possible that the 
existence of other slack resources can strengthen the relationships between ILMs and 
diversification strategy: where firms have valuable, specific human resources and other 
slack resources, firms are especially likely to choose diversification as a means for 
appropriating the value of those resources. 
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Table 1.  SIC codes in financial services 
 
1987 SIC Code Description 
6021 National Commercial Banks 
6022 State Commercial Banks 
6029 Commercial Banks NEC 
6035 Savings Institutions (Fed) 
6036 Savings Inst (Not Fed) 
6061 Credit Unions (Fed) 
6062 Credit Unions (Not Fed) 
6081 Branches of Foreign Banks 
6099 Functions Related to Deposit Banking 
6111 Federal Credit Agencies 
6141 Personal Credit Inst  
6153 Short Term Business Credit Inst 
6159 Miscellaneous Business Credit 
6162 Mortgage Bankers & Loan Correspondents 
6163 Loan Brokers 
6211 Security Brokers and Dealers 
6221 Commodity Contracts Brokers and Dealers 
6231 Security and Commodity Exchanges 
6282 Investment Advice 
6289 Securities Exchange Services 
6311 Life Insurance 
6321 Accident and Health Insurance 
6324 Hospital & Medical Service Plans 
6331 Fire Marine and Casualty Insurance 
6351 Surety Insurance 
6361 Title Insurance 
6371 Pension, Health and Welfare Funds 
6399 Insurance Carriers 
6411 Insurance Agents, Brokers, and Service 
6712 Offices of Bank Holding Companies 
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 Table 2.  Single- and multi-unit firm counts, 1992-2000 
Single Units Multi-Units 
Year 
Number of 
Firms 
Percent of 
Total 
Number of 
Firms 
Percent of 
Total Total 
1992 157,959 90.3 17,059 9.7 175,018 
1993 163,575 90.9 16,471 9.1 180,046 
1994 166,126 91.4 15,698 8.6 181,824 
1995 164,606 91.7 14,984 8.3 179,590 
1996 169,070 92.6 13,577 7.4 182,647 
1997 181,277 91.6 16,684 8.4 197,961 
1998 188,965 92.1 16,258 7.9 205,223 
1999 193,377 92.6 15,530 7.4 208,907 
2000 195,645 92.9 14,881 7.1 210,526 
Total 1,580,600 91.8 141,142 8.2 1,721,742 
Source:  Authors’ calculations on the LBD. 
 
Table 3.  Single- and multi-unit establishment counts, 1992-2000 
Single Units Multi-Units 
Year 
Number of 
Establishments 
Percent of 
Total 
Number of 
Establishments
Percent of 
Total Total 
1992 157,959 46.6 180,713 53.4 338,672 
1993 163,575 48.3 175,345 51.7 338,920 
1994 166,126 47.7 182,072 52.3 348,198 
1995 164,606 47.2 184,452 52.8 349,058 
1996 169,070 47.8 184,299 52.2 353,369 
1997 181,277 47.6 199,253 52.4 380,530 
1998 188,965 48.8 198,534 51.2 387,499 
1999 193,377 48.4 206,200 51.6 399,577 
2000 195,645 48.8 204,887 51.2 400,532 
Total 1,580,600 47.9 1,715,755 52.1 3,296,355 
Source:  Authors’ calculations on the LBD. 
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Table 4.  Percent of payroll and employment represented by single- and multi-unit  
firms, 1992-2000 
  Single Units Multi-Units 
Year 
Percent of 
Total Payroll
Percent of 
Total 
Employment 
Percent of 
Total Payroll
Percent of 
Total 
Employment  
1992 13.90 15.09 86.10 84.91 
1993 16.17 16.92 83.83 83.08 
1994 13.64 16.97 86.36 83.03 
1995 13.41 17.02 86.59 82.98 
1996 14.97 18.19 85.03 81.81 
1997 15.09 17.03 84.91 82.97 
1998 16.80 18.73 83.20 81.27 
1999 16.03 18.84 83.97 81.16 
2000 15.56 19.05 84.44 80.95 
All Years 15.16 17.58 84.84 82.42 
Source:  Authors’ calculations on the LBD. 
 
 
Table 5.  Mean of firm diversification measures weighted by total firm payroll, selected 
years, 1992-2000 
 
Year 
County 
Diversification 
State  
Diversification
Industry  
Diversification
Geographic 
Distance 
Industry 
Distance 
 
All firms
 
Long-
term 
continuers
 
All firms
 
Long-
term 
continuers
 
All firms
 
Long-
term 
continuers
 
All firms 
 
Long-
term 
continuers 
 
All firms
 
Long-
term 
continuers
 
1992 0.618 0.668 0.456 0.520 0.244 0.273 0.778 0.814 0.831 0.860 
1997 0.626 0.648 0.494 0.516 0.258 0.279 0.784 0.797 0.844 0.858 
2000 0.642 0.678 0.541 0.568 0.273 0.308 0.806 0.839 0.859 0.887 
Source:  Authors’ calculations on the LBD. 
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Source:  Authors’ calculations on the LBD. 
Figure 1.  Mean of multi-unit firm diversification measures weighted by total firm 
payroll, 1992-2000 
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Source:  Authors’ calculations on the LBD. 
Figure 2.  Mean of long-term continuer multi-unit firm diversification measures 
weighted by total firm payroll, 1992-2000 
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Source:  Authors’ calculations on the LBD. 
Figure 3.  Scatter plots of multi-unit firm diversification measures, 1997 and 2000 
 
 45 
 
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Continuer(1997) Exit(1997) Continuer(2000) Entrant(2000)
 
Source:  Authors’ calculations on the LBD and LEHD data. 
Figure 4a.  Shares of payroll for continuing, entering, and exiting firms 
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Source:  Authors’ calculations on the LBD and LEHD data. 
Figure 4b.  Diversification decomposition (1997-2000) change:  continuers, net entry, 
and total 
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Source:  Authors’ calculations on the LBD and LEHD data. 
Figure 4c.  Diversification decomposition (1997-2000 change):  within, between, cross, 
entry, exit, and total 
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Figure 5a.  Scatter plot of firm-level churning 
 
Figure 5b.  Scatter plot of firm-level wage-tenure profiles 
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Figure 5c.  Scatter plot of within firm wage dispersion (log difference between 90th and 
10th percentile within firm) 
 
Figure 5.  Scatter plots of ILM indicators 
Source:  Authors’ calculations on LEHD data. 
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Table 6. Summary of variable definitions 
Independent 
Variable Definition 
firmage1997 Firm age in 1997 
growth Average net employment growth 
size Average number of full quarter workers 
lnsize Average log number of full quarter workers 
shr_fem Average share of female workers 
shr_low Average share of low human capital workers 
shr_high Average share of high human capital workers 
shr_hw Average share of high wage workers 
wjwg Average within job wage growth (five years) for new hires 
chr Average churning  
diff Average within firm 90-10 log wage differential 
  
Dependent 
Variable Definition 
county_div Change in geographic diversification at county level 
state_div Change in geographic diversification at state level 
ind_div Change in diversification at industry level 
geog_dist_div Change in geographic diversification at county level, weighted by distance
ind_dist_div Change in diversification at industry level, weighted by relatedness 
 
Notes: 
The independent variables in this table are five-year (1992-1996) averages. 
The dependent variables indicate the change in the indices (construction described in the 
text) from 1997 to 2000. 
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Table 7. Unweighted Summary Statistics  
Statistics chr diff shr_hw wjwg shr_low shr_high growth shr_fem size lnsize 
  Mean 0.07 1.89 0.35 0.09 0.25 0.26 0.07 0.64 63.99 2.74 
  Std. Dev. 0.07 0.72 0.22 0.09 0.16 0.16 0.24 0.20 441.93 1.12 
  N 8,775 8,775 8,775 5,370 7,963 7,857 8,775 8,775 8,775 8,775 
Correlation                     
  chr 1.00          
  diff -0.06 1.00         
  share_hw -0.11 0.04 1.00        
  wjwg 0.05 0.07 0.09 1.00       
  shr_low -0.16 0.12 -0.36 -0.09 1.00      
  shr_high -0.03 0.24 0.55 0.17 -0.40 1.00     
  growth -0.06 0.01 0.09 0.03 -0.04 0.13 1.00    
  shr_fem -0.08 -0.14 -0.46 -0.08 0.17 -0.42 -0.11 1.00   
  size 0.04 -0.06 0.04 0.01 -0.07 -0.03 -0.03 0.00 1.00  
  lnsize 0.17 -0.26 0.04 0.00 -0.26 -0.22 -0.10 0.06 0.47 1.00 
 
 
Table 8. Weighted Summary Statistics 
Statistics chr diff shr_hw wjwg shr_low shr_high growth shr_fem size lnsize 
  Mean 0.09 1.60 0.41 0.09 0.18 0.22 0.02 0.64 3115.84 6.37 
  Std. Dev. 0.05 0.48 0.19 0.04 0.10 0.11 0.16 0.13 4666.29 2.29 
  N 8,775 8,775 8,775 5,370 7,963 7,857 8,775 8,775 8,775 8,775 
Correlation                     
  chr 1.00          
  diff 0.20 1.00         
  share_hw -0.25 -0.09 1.00        
  wjwg 0.07 0.20 0.05 1.00       
  shr_low -0.05 0.10 -0.46 -0.15 1.00      
  shr_high 0.07 0.42 0.52 0.27 -0.55 1.00     
  growth -0.16 0.00 0.02 0.02 -0.06 0.09 1.00    
  shr_fem -0.08 -0.23 -0.58 -0.11 0.29 -0.55 -0.01 1.00   
  size -0.02 -0.04 0.26 0.05 -0.21 0.07 -0.07 -0.12 1.00  
  lnsize 0.08 -0.17 0.27 0.06 -0.29 -0.02 -0.11 -0.09 0.74 1.00 
 
Note: All variables as defined in Table 6.   Weighted statistics are weighted by average 
employment from 1992-96.  Correlations in bold are statistically significantly different 
from zero at p<0.05. 
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Table 9. Ordinary least squares regression results for diversification measuresa
 (1) county_div 
(2) 
state_div 
(3) 
ind_div 
(4) 
geog_dist_div 
(5) 
ind_dist_div 
(Constant) 0.132** 0.237** 0.008 0.090** 0.052**
 (0.024) (0.025) (0.025) (0.023) (0.014) 
firmage1997b      
1-6 years -0.026 -0.020 -0.039 -0.010 -0.007 
 (0.025) (0.025) (0.026) (0.023) (0.014) 
7-10 years -0.021 -0.031 -0.038 -0.006 0.011 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.018) (0.011) 
11-20 years 0.018* 0.005 0.085** -0.007 -0.007 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.005) 
log_size -0.019** -0.025** -0.007** -0.011** -0.007**
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Growth 0.054* -0.057* 0.044 0.078** 0.103**
 (0.025) (0.025) (0.026) (0.023) (0.014) 
shr_fem 0.109** 0.143** 0.025 0.099** 0.048**
 (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.022) (0.014) 
shr_high -0.018 0.019 -0.012 -0.136** -0.052**
 (0.022) (0.023) (0.023) (0.021) (0.013) 
      
N 4818 4818 4818 4818 4818 
R2 0.21 0.27 0.14 0.20 0.21 
a Industry dummies and state dummies are not reported. Standard errors are in 
parentheses; b over 20 years old is omitted;  * p < 0.05, **  p < 0.01 
Further note: For this and subsequent regression models we measure firm size with the 
the overall (national) level of employment in the firm. Tables 7 & 8 reflected only 
employment in our three LEHD states. Subsequent drafts will use the national level in all 
tables.  
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Table 10. Ordinary least squares regression results for diversification measuresa
 (1) county_div 
(2) 
state_div 
(3) 
ind_div 
(4) 
geog_dist_div 
(5) 
ind_dist_div 
(Constant) 0.206** 0.294** 0.074** 0.155** 0.097**
 (0.024) (0.025) (0.025) (0.023) (0.014) 
firmage1997b      
1-6 years -0.054* -0.032 -0.052* -0.031 -0.023 
 (0.024) (0.025) (0.025) (0.023) (0.014) 
7-10 years -0.056** -0.052** -0.060** -0.032 -0.009 
 (0.019) (0.020) (0.020) (0.018) (0.011) 
11-20 years 0.000 -0.011 0.065** -0.024** -0.019**
 (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.005) 
log_size -0.021** -0.027** -0.009** -0.014** -0.008**
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Growth 0.011 -0.091** 0.013 0.045 0.080**
 (0.024) (0.025) (0.025) (0.023) (0.014) 
shr_fem 0.071** 0.105** -0.028 0.057** 0.020 
 (0.023) (0.024) (0.024) (0.022) (0.014) 
shr_high -0.069** 0.005 0.013 -0.148** -0.065**
 (0.023) (0.024) (0.024) (0.022) (0.013) 
chr -0.473** -0.412** -0.075 -0.178** -0.132**
 (0.057) (0.059) (0.060) (0.054) (0.033) 
diff -0.044** -0.055** -0.076** -0.052** -0.033**
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.004) 
wjwg 0.721** 0.345** 0.387** 0.568** 0.425**
 (0.049) (0.050) (0.051) (0.046) (0.028) 
      
N 4818 4818 4818 4818 4818 
R2 0.26 0.30 0.17 0.24 0.26 
∆ R2  0.05** 0.03** 0.03** 0.04** 0.05**
a Industry dummies and state dummies are not reported. Standard errors are in parentheses; b over 
20 years old is omitted; ∆ R2 : vs. control only model; * p < 0.05, **  p < 0.01
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Table 11. Ordinary least squares regression results for diversification measuresa
 (1) county_div 
(2) 
state_div 
(3) 
ind_div 
(4) 
geog_dist_div 
(5) 
ind_dist_div 
(Constant) 0.203** 0.296** 0.061* 0.141** 0.086**
 (0.024) (0.025) (0.025) (0.023) (0.014) 
firmage1997b      
1-6 years -0.054* -0.032 -0.048 -0.024 -0.019 
 (0.024) (0.025) (0.025) (0.023) (0.014) 
7-10 years -0.057** -0.053** -0.057** -0.030 -0.007 
 (0.019) (0.020) (0.020) (0.018) (0.011) 
11-20 years -0.000 -0.011 0.067** -0.020* -0.017**
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.005) 
log_size -0.021** -0.027** -0.010** -0.014** -0.009**
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Growth 0.009 -0.089** -0.000 0.033 0.070**
 (0.024) (0.025) (0.025) (0.023) (0.014) 
shr_fem 0.076** 0.103** -0.010 0.073** 0.034*
 (0.023) (0.024) (0.024) (0.022) (0.014) 
shr_high -0.074** 0.001 0.028 -0.132** -0.055**
 (0.023) (0.024) (0.024) (0.022) (0.014) 
chr -0.468** -0.396** -0.147* -0.256** -0.189**
 (0.059) (0.061) (0.062) (0.056) (0.034) 
diff -0.044** -0.056** -0.074** -0.053** -0.033**
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.004) 
wjwg 0.767** 0.292** 0.598** 0.649** 0.545**
 (0.063) (0.065) (0.066) (0.060) (0.037) 
chr×wjwg -3.372** -1.682* 0.472 -1.761* -1.471**
 (0.788) (0.816) (0.821) (0.745) (0.455) 
chr×diff 0.118 -0.002 0.385** 0.575** 0.408**
 (0.107) (0.110) (0.111) (0.101) (0.062) 
wjwg×diff 0.026 0.133* -0.346** -0.078 -0.148**
 (0.061) (0.063) (0.063) (0.057) (0.035) 
      
N 4818 4818 4818 4818 4818 
R2 0.26 0.30 0.18 0.25 0.27 
a Industry dummies and state dummies are not reported. Standard errors are in parentheses; b over 20 years 
old is omitted; * p < 0.05, **  p < 0.01 
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